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The Maxse Letter

Do we need to rewrite the history of the Charge?

by David Kelsey with contributions from Tony Lucking and Keith Smith


Any original letter written by a survivor of the charge is of historical interest, but whether it adds to our knowledge of the event must be judged in the light of other sources. Eye-witness accounts given in good faith may be misleading, for reasons discussed in the introduction to Pemberton’s book. 1 These considerations did not deter the press from informing us last October that a new find now requires the story of the Light Brigade charge to be rewritten: Lucan and Cardigan, we were told, did not exchange words before the charge, and if they had spoken, the Light Brigade would have been saved.

The origin of the stories lay in an auction catalogue: 2 ‘Lot 307, Crimean War and the Charge of the Light Brigade. Highly important collection of c70 letters by Lieutenant Henry Fitzhardinge (Fitz) Maxse . . . and by his brother Lieutenant Frederick Augustus Maxse RN.’ In the catalogue, Phillips, the auctioneers, give an account of the events leading up to the charge, creating a setting for the jewel of the collection, a letter by Fitz Maxse dated 28 October 1854, which included:

An order was sent to Lord Lucan for Lord C to attack with light Brigade — he sent me to Lord Lucan to say that the spot we were ordered to attack was ¾ of a mile off that there were batteries on each side and a heavy battery in front also that the hills were lined with riflemen — Lord Lucan said he could not help it & we must attack. Lord C dropped his sword and led the way 20 yards in front of the Brigade.

Another document in the same sale is described as verifying Maxse’s letter. Private James Olley of the 4th Light Dragoons recounted the following exchange:

After a time Captain Nolan brought orders to the Earl of Lucan — I was within ten paces from the Earl and his Staff when the Order was brought in ‘We may advance but what can we do?’ said the Earl. ‘There is the Enemy and there are the Guns,’ cavalierly replied Nolan, pointing to the Russian Squadrons. The Earl of Lucan forwarded the Order by Captain Nolan to the Earl of Cardigan.

The catalogue claims that the Maxse letter sheds new light on the charge: ‘The papers do not appear to have been consulted by scholars, including Cecil Woodham-Smith and Saul David, Cardigan’s latest biographer.’ That may be so, but others, including Pemberton and Harris 3 did consult them, without coming to dramatic conclusions.

Lucan and Cardigan told Kinglake that they conversed about the order for the Light Brigade to attack. 4 Comparing the Maxse letter with their statements, Phillips say: ‘There can be no doubt but that all three reports are all describing the same exchange.’ Felix Pryor, a manuscripts specialist, declared: ‘Because more or less the same conversation is recounted it seems certain that the conversation between Lucan and Cardigan never took place.’ 5

This reasoning is hard to follow. If a message by aide-de-camp was followed by a personal exchange on the same subject, it would not be surprising if the same words were used. Having found words to sum up the dangers, Cardigan was not likely to search his vocabulary for elegant variation a few minutes later. Kinglake says of him that he ‘was of the species which repeats a hundred times over in the same words the same version of the same facts.’ 6 Moreover, Lucan and Cardigan refer to their conversation as a repetition of a previous message by aide-de-camp. 7

Another letter in the collection suggests that Maxse himself corroborated this. On 5 February 1855 his uncle, Henry Berkeley MP, wrote to Maxse’s mother to verify

the statement you gave me in the words of your Son — as to the position of the Russians being detailed to Lord Lucan by one of Lord Cardigan’s Aids de Camp, (videlicit Fitz) and then Lord Lucan rides up and propriâ personâ et viva voce, ITERATES THE ORDER against which Cardigan had demurred through his Aid de Camp ,TO CHARGE.

On 29 March 1855, moving a motion in the Commons to have Lucan court-martialled, Berkeley said:

Lord Cardigan sent his aide-de-camp to Lord Lucan to explain the nature of the ground, and to state that the place ordered to be attacked was three-quarters of a mile distant, that there were batteries on each flank, and that the hills on each side were covered with infantry. Lord Lucan still persevered in his order to charge, and then Lord Cardigan himself iterated to Lord Lucan the description just given.

He undoubtedly would have confirmed this with his nephew Fitz when preparing his speech.

Phillips discount Lucan’s and Cardigan’s statements on two grounds: one, that they were made ‘a considerable time after the event;’ and two, that ‘neither . . . can be regarded as impartial: both men had good reason to try and shift the blame onto the other.’ The first of these objections overlooks their speeches in the House of Lords in March 1855. Lucan could not have spoken any earlier; his application for a court-martial had been rejected only a week before. The second objection would have force only if Lucan and Cardigan differed on what had occurred, but in fact they agree that there was both a message and a meeting. If anything, their mutual antipathy lends weight to their evidence; when Lucan and Cardigan agree, it suggests incontestable fact. They did not try to blame each other for giving the order to charge. After his prompt disavowal (‘I received the order to attack from my superior officer’), Cardigan was not in any danger of being held responsible. Lucan never denied that he had issued the order. His case was that he had done so under the necessity of an imperative and positive order from Raglan.

Phillips acknowledge the contrary evidence, but say, ‘To sum up: although Lucan and Cardigan may well have, at some point, exchanged words in front of the Light Brigade it seems unlikely that Cardigan took his “astonishing step” . . . of directly questioning his brother-in-law about the order to charge. The balance of evidence points to the probability that it was instead Fitz who was deputed to the task.’ Let us resist the temptation to wonder what else Lucan and Cardigan might have been talking about moments before the charge, and address the question of the balance of evidence.

Some points need to be borne in mind: (a) direct evidence of a conversation must depend largely on the testimony of those concerned — there is little chance of deciding what took place between Lucan and Cardigan if their own statements are disregarded; (b) Maxse’s and Cardigan’s recollections may not be independent — they spent a lot of time together in the days following the charge, no doubt exchanging and assimilating each other’s stories; (c) when a person recounts a first-hand experience time and time again, it becomes more and more likely, with every repetition, that he is recalling, not the experience itself, but his last rendition of it, not necessarily the most accurate.

There are nine accounts of the events in question that need to be considered:

(These accounts are compared in detail in the Appendix)

From these accounts, the following sequence emerges as the most likely order of events:

  1. Lucan received the order to advance from Raglan via Nolan.
  2. Lucan ordered the cavalry division to mount.
  3. Cardigan sent a message to Lucan via Maxse about the Russian positions.
  4. Lucan replied to Maxse’s message.
  5. Lucan rode forward and personally ordered Cardigan to advance with the Light Brigade.
  6. Cardigan responded with an observation about the Russian positions.
  7. Lucan confirmed the order.

This sequence is consistent with all the accounts, including Maxse’s letter, with four reservations:

It is important to distinguish between Lucan receiving Raglan’s order, and Lucan giving Cardigan the order to advance. Note carefully what Maxse wrote: ‘An order was sent to Lord Lucan for Lord C to attack with Light Brigade. He sent me to Lord Lucan to say . . .’ He is saying that his mission came after event 1 (Lucan’s receipt of Raglan’s order), not after event 5 (Cardigan’s receipt of Lucan’s order). At the time he wrote (the same day that Raglan was writing his official despatch of the battle) he would not have known the contents of Raglan’s order. His description of it, that it was an order for Lord C to attack with the Light Brigade, was a mistaken inference from what had in fact ensued. However, he goes on to say that his message included how far it was to ‘the spot we were ordered to attack,’ which would require Cardigan to have already received Lucan’s order. Cardigan’s accounts of the message do not mention the distance. It may be significant that the facsimile of the letter shows that Maxse had started to write, ‘He sent me to Lord Lucan to say that there . . .’ but then struck out the last two letters, amending it to ‘ . . . that there spot we were ordered to attack was ¾ of a mile off that there were batteries . . . ’ It could be that he had started to describe the actual content of the message (‘to say that there were batteries . . .’ ), but then thought that its import would not be appreciated, and inserted the distance out of context. Interpretation of the letter must take account of the circumstances in which it was written. Maxse was on his sickbed, nursing a damaged foot, and even before he was wounded had been subject to recurrent bouts of fever. His letter closes, ‘I am too tired — to write more dearest Mum . . .’ In telegraphic style, punctuated with dashes, he had summarised in a few lines events to which others were to devote whole books. He himself described the letter a few days later as a ‘hurried pencil scrawl.’

Cardigan sent Maxse on his errand before receiving Lucan’s order to advance. What prompted him to do so? In the House of Lords he said that ‘observing a movement was going to be made,’ he had sent the message. In his statement to Kinglake he said ‘The brigade was suddenly ordered to mount, upon which I sent one of my aides-de-camp to reconnoitre the ground.’ (He can hardly have meant the last remark literally; generations later the expression was in use in the army to mean going to HQ to find out what was going on.) Taking both statements together, Adkin’s 13 seems the most reasonable interpretation: that upon receiving Raglan’s order, Lucan first ordered the cavalry division to mount, then discussed Raglan’s order with Nolan. Alerted by the order to mount, given by bugle call, Cardigan sent Maxse to find out what was afoot, and to make sure that Lucan was aware of the Russian strength around the north valley.

Lucan’s statements imply that Maxse’s message was earlier, and mentioned only batteries on the left. In the Lords he said, ‘I received a communication from his lordship, through his aide-de-camp, objecting to stand where he was, because he was so much in advance that he expected the batteries on the left to open upon him.’ To Kinglake he said, ‘When ordered to take up his then position, he had expressed, through his aide-de-camp, the same apprehensions’[that he would be exposed to a flanking battery]. Cardigan said his message mentioned batteries on both sides. Adkin believes that Cardigan could not have seen the guns on the right, and was applying hindsight in his account, 14 but Maxse’s letter supports Cardigan, and Adkin elsewhere 15 quotes the recollections of Private Albert Mitchell of the 13th Light Dragoons, who mentions guns on both sides.

It is impossible to reconcile the time difference; one must opt for one or the other. Cardigan’s version has the support of Maxse. A misrecollection by Lucan could have arisen thus: he failed to connect Cardigan’s message with the order to mount, and thought that he was objecting to his present position; months later, when he was accused of so far failing to respond to order no.3 that he had not even moved any troops forward, he quoted Cardigan’s objection in rebuttal; having associated the significance of the message with order no.3, his memory adjusted the timing to suit.

By the time Maxse arrived, Lucan had come to the conclusion that Raglan wanted an attack against the Russian guns. He may not have given Maxse a formal response. He probably felt it unnecessary as he was about to speak to Cardigan personally, but he might have made an aside, such as ‘It doesn’t matter — we’re going to attack anyway.’ This would account for Maxse writing, ‘Lord Lucan said he could not help it and we must attack.’ Alternatively, Maxse may have been reporting Lucan’s later answer to Cardigan as if it were the answer given to him. Cardigan’s letter of the 6 April 1855 contains a similar ambiguity. He wrote, ‘the only message I ever sent was . . . , and the answer was, "We were about to attack immediately."’ This could refer either to an immediate answer to his message, or the later answer to his spoken comments. The only account which specifies unambiguously that Lucan gave an answer to Maxse is the 1855 pamphlet:

Lord Lucan, who was at this time riding up to the right flank of the Light Cavalry Brigade, replied,— ‘Tell Lord Cardigan that he is placed there by Lord Raglan’s orders, but that I will take care of him.’ 16

This is interesting in suggesting that Lucan had already started forward when Maxse came up to him. However, the reported reply is uncomfortably similar to what Lucan told Cardigan before the charge of the Heavy Brigade: ‘Remember that you are placed here by Lord Raglan himself . . .’ 17 The pamphlet may have been hastily assembled with scant regard for accuracy.

Lucan then rode forward and personally gave Cardigan the order for the Light Brigade to advance. Only one of the accounts contradicts this — James Olley’s statement that ‘The Earl of Lucan forwarded the Order by Captain Nolan to the Earl of Cardigan.’ Olley is clearly mistaken if he means that Nolan took the order forward. He may have seen Nolan proceeding in that direction on his way to join Morris, possibly even ahead of Lucan, but it is not easy to believe that Nolan and Cardigan had an exchange of words so muted that nobody else noticed it. If Lucan was not going to deliver the order personally, he would have used his own aide-de-camp. Sending Nolan would have been tantamount to giving Cardigan the right to receive orders direct from Raglan, a concession Lucan would never have made. It is just possible that Olley meant that Lucan forwarded the ‘order-by-Captain-Nolan’ to Cardigan by another hand. Olley’s note was dictated in 1897, more than 40 years after the event. He may have been to London for the Diamond Jubilee celebrations and met other survivors of the charge, 18 with whom he would have exchanged stories. It could have been suggested to him then that he should record his recollections for posterity.

Only Lucan’s and Cardigan’s own statements tell us what words were exchanged between them, but as they agree in all major respects, there is no reason to doubt them. There are some minor differences. As in the case of Maxse’s message, Cardigan refers to batteries on both sides, Lucan to only one side. There being no motive for either party to lie on this point, mistaken memory is indicated. Lucan’s version of his reply is ‘I told him that I was aware of it. “I know it,” but that “Lord Raglan would have it,” and that we had no choice but to obey.’ Cardigan, in all his statements, says that Lucan replied that it was Lord Raglan’s ‘positive order.’

Do we, then, need to rewrite the history of the charge? If Lucan and Cardigan did not have the face-to-face exchange, then they conspired to deceive the House of Lords, and Cardigan swore a perjured affidavit, knowing that he could be cross-examined on it and that witnesses to the truth were probably available. It is altogether more likely that their reported conversation did take place, and that any inconsistent evidence arises from mistaken memory or loose wording.



The Phillips claim that Cardigan did not speak personally to Lucan about the Russian strength around the north valley was a platform from which they launched a bigger theory. Mr Pryor was quoted as saying: ‘Had the men actually met there is a strong possibility that Lucan might have shown Cardigan the order and that Cardigan might have spotted Lucan’s error.’  19 Since the initial premise and supposition are untrue — they did speak together, but that did not result in Cardigan’s seeing the order — the conclusion obviously falls by default. However, it is worth examining for two reasons: it is a frequently recurring theme, and it goes to the heart of the crucial stage of the battle at which both sides failed to seize their chance of a decisive victory.

The theory that proper consultation between the two earls would have avoided disaster follows the Woodham-Smith ‘Greek tragedy’ version of the charge: 20 that fatal flaws in the characters of Lucan and Cardigan doomed them to make a catastrophic mistake at a moment of crisis, resulting in calamity. The notion is not new, and has had a number of variants: that the charge would not have happened if only Lucan had shown Cardigan the actual order — if only they had been able to discuss it amicably — if only they had discussed it at all. To believe it, one must accept Raglan’s assertion that his order had a clear meaning which Lucan misunderstood.

This proposition receives support from Kinglake’s account of how Nolan, as the brigade proceeded down the valley, realised that they were going the wrong way, and galloped across their front waving his sword, vainly trying to lead them in the right direction. There are a number of things to be said about this story. First, it was denied immediately it was published, ironically by Fitz Maxse. ‘I take the opportunity of here stating my impression that Captain Nolan . . . intended to charge the guns we did charge, and no other. I have no recollection of his divergence in the manner described by Mr. Kinglake either by deed or gesture until after he was struck; then his horse took the line pointed out by Mr. Kinglake.’ 21 Second, Nolan, a superb horseman, would have had no difficulty in cantering up to Cardigan and speaking in his ear, rather than galloping about gesticulating. A third and most significant implication of the story we shall come to later.

The first appearance of the ‘lack of consultation’ theory was in Hardinge’s letter to Newcastle of 26 January 1855, endorsing the decision to recall Lucan. In the House of Lords on 19 March 1855, Hardinge said of his letter:

The noble earl also referred to my letter in which I state,—

‘It is to be regretted that the lieutenant-general, acting upon a misconception of a written order, did not show that order to Lord Cardigan, and that . . . he did not decide upon his own judgment, supported by the concurrence of his major-general, that the charge ought not to be made.’

Surely, my lords, I am justified in making that assertion, because at the time the letter was written I had seen Lord Cardigan, and had his opinion, and not only did he think the charge ought not to have been made — that it was useless and worse than useless — but that he had never read the order, that he had never been consulted.

From this it is clear that Cardigan himself was the author of the idea that he might have saved the day. By this time he had seen the order, but he did not claim that he would have understood it differently, only that he would have used his discretion not to obey it. Hardinge concurred. Neither the War Ministry nor the Horse Guards ever embraced the Raglan view that his order had a good meaning which Lucan misunderstood. Their case against Lucan was that he had disagreed with his commander, and had not exercised his discretion to disregard the order.

Even if Lucan had shown the written order to Cardigan, and they had discussed it rationally and amicably, Cardigan would have read the same words that Lucan read, and would have heard the same explanation from Nolan that Lucan heard. Kinglake tells us: ‘Whether taken alone, or as a command reinforcing the one before sent, this order [no. 4] has really no word in it which is either obscure or misleading.’ 22 What then was the unmistakable meaning that eluded Lucan but would have been clear to Cardigan? There can be no better authority on Raglan’s meaning than Raglan himself. In his official despatch 23, Raglan said that he wanted the cavalry:

  1. to follow the enemy in their retreat; and
  2. to try to prevent them from removing the captured guns.
His letter of observations 24 defending his use of the word ‘misconception’ runs to 1,000 words without once saying what a proper conception of the order would have been. It does, however, state that ‘the second (order) was connected with and a repetition of the first.’ * To the true interpretation of order no. 4 we may therefore add:
  1. to recover the heights.
Raglan was never required, nor ever volunteered, to be any more specific as to the meaning of the order. However, it probably does him no injustice to suppose that Kinglake accurately reflects his views, and that assumption will be made in what follows.

No amount of consultation between Lucan and Cardigan could have deduced intention (1), because the enemy was not in retreat. After taking redoubt no. 4, the Russians had dismantled it and fallen back to no. 3, feeling that no. 4 was situated ‘too much in front’25 and after their cavalry advances southward had been severely repulsed by the 93rd and the Heavy Brigade, all their cavalry had fallen back to reform its ranks behind the right wing of their line of battle. 26 These movements were over before the fourth order was issued. By then the Russians were securely established on and behind a line which ran in a convoluted curve from Kamara, through the first three redoubts, around the eastern end of the north valley, and along the Fedioukine Heights.

Kinglake and Calthorpe describe the circumstances giving rise to orders 3 and 4. The former wrote:

. . . some of [the Headquarters Staff] who had been pointing their field-glasses along the line of the Causeway ridge perceived all at once, as they thought, that the enemy was bringing forward some teams of artillery horses, with the lasso tackle attached to them; and they did not doubt — what otherwise seemed very probable — that the enemy, who was evidently preparing to retreat, must be seeking to carry off with him as trophies the English guns taken from the Turks. 27

The oft-repeated statement that the watchers saw, or thought they saw, English guns being carried away is an exaggeration. What they saw, or thought they saw, was Russian horses with tackle being brought forward. The presumption, on this slender evidence, that the Russians were about to retreat, carrying off our guns with them, was unwarranted. Calthorpe wrote:

Lord Raglan . . . thought that he perceived a retrograde movement on the part of the enemy. . . . [He] sent an order to Lord Lucan, to the effect that the cavalry were to advance and take any opportunity that might offer to recapture the heights. . . . A pause of over half an hour ensued, after the lapse of which time Lord Raglan, still under the impression — whether erroneous or not it is impossible to say — that the Russians intended immediately to retire, and take with them our guns, sent another order to Lord Lucan. 28

What had been seen as an actual retreat had faded in half an hour to an impression of an intention to retire, and a possibly erroneous one at that. A dutiful nephew and loyal aide-de-camp could hardly say more clearly that Raglan was wrong — there were no retreating Russians taking away our guns.

With regard to intention (2), if there were guns being taken away, they were those from the first three redoubts. As they were within the Russian line of defence, only a direct frontal assault could prevent the Russians from carrying them away.

Likewise, to execute intention (3) the cavalry would have had to recapture all the redoubts, or at least nos. 2 and 3. When the allies had held the heights, they had done so by the presence of only two and a half battalions of Turks (some 1,100 men) and nine 12-pounder guns. To take these positions, the Russians had thrown against them, in a surprise dawn attack, three columns totalling more than 15 battalions and 36 guns. 29 After the Heavy Brigade’s victory, Lord Raglan thought that the Russian position was so weak that Lucan’s cavalry division with one troop of Horse Artillery, their every move observed by the Russians in full light of day, could retake the redoubts without a fight. Kinglake says:

The defeat of the Russian cavalry carried with it the retreat of the powerful artillery which the horse had escorted. . . the Russians . . .[were] now all at once reduced to . . . two weak columns. 30
. . . judging . . . that the weak chain of Russian infantry columns . . . along the line of the redoubts would prove somewhat soft to the touch, he [Raglan] determined . . . to make an appeal to his cavalry [i.e. order no. 3]31
Lord Raglan watched for the moment when his cavalry . . . would begin its advance, and he watched with the expectation . . . that the movement would cause the enemy to abandon his already relaxing hold, and give up the captured redoubts. 32

Kinglake claims that Russian movements demonstrated the correctness of this appraisal. As the Light Brigade advanced up the north valley, the Odessa Regiment, he relates, retreated along the heights, and only re-occupied them when our cavalry retired. Even if such movements were possible in the time available (which Adkin doubts 33), what Kinglake describes is no more than the Russian infantry shadowing the Light Brigade, ready to oppose it should it turn south. They formed squares to resist, not to run — of all infantry formations, squares were the least conducive to rapid movement.

Raglan had no overall aim from which Lucan and Cardigan might infer a meaning for order no. 4. After the charge of the Heavy Brigade, Raglan had two reasonable options. The battle had been of the Russians’ choosing. It was their offensive, and once the setbacks to their cavalry had brought it to a halt and forced them into a defensive posture, they had failed. Raglan’s first option, therefore, was to rest content with that result. There were those who assumed that he would. Captain Shakespear wrote that after the Heavy Brigade’s success he considered ‘all immediate action over, if not, indeed, the whole thing for the day.’ 34

Raglan’s second option was to try to turn the Russians’ failure into a decisive defeat. He had lost his best chance by not bringing a substantial infantry force into the plain the day before, on receipt of Campbell’s intelligence of an impending attack. By late morning, however, he had available three divisions of infantry, two English and one French. Events had already shown that the allies could compensate for deficiency in numbers by superior discipline, training, weaponry, and tactics. A properly planned and co-ordinated attack, utilising all the allied forces on the plain — infantry, cavalry, and artillery — might have dealt the Russians a third and decisive blow. Lord Raglan had conceived no such plan, nor invited others to do so.

Rejecting or ignoring both his valid options, he ordered a cavalry movement which could serve no long-term purpose. By this time the redoubts had become a dangerous irrelevance. They had done the allies no good when they had held them, nor had their capture given the Russians the key to Balaclava. Like the spiked guns they contained, they had only a symbolic role beyond their worth. The ‘strategically vital’ route which they controlled ran from Russian territory at one end to allied territory at the other, and therefore carried no through traffic. As to local traffic, its loss did not sever communication between Balaclava and the besieging army, and when infantry were required on the plain as quickly as possible, they were forbidden to use the road lest it become clogged up with troops! Regaining the heights was pointless unless they were to be held, which would require an infantry commitment Raglan was not prepared to make. Cathcart was justified in his assessment that it was not worth sacrificing lives to take the redoubts, only to vacate them again to return to the trenches. 35 But now Raglan’s sole purpose was to recapture the heights.

How he thought that it might be done, in Kinglake’s view, is revealed by the story of Nolan trying to turn the Light Brigade. Nolan, it seems, was not alarmed that the Light Brigade set off down the north valley, only that it did not turn right part way along. From this it appears that what Raglan wanted was for the cavalry to pass to the north of redoubt no. 4, then wheel half right and assail redoubt no. 3 from the north-west, at which the Russians should fall back before them. The map below suggests a more likely result. The cavalry would have been under fire from three batteries at once, riding uphill, into a battery, infantry squares, and rifles. Their losses could well have been no less than those actually incurred in the charge they did make. 36




An alternative cavalry disaster?

Map of alternative line of charge




Adapted from Map 13, p.141, of The Charge, by kind permission of the author, Major Mark Adkin, whose consent does not imply agreement with the views herein expressed.


There was no rational basis for Raglan’s belief that the Russians would be a ‘soft touch’. Their cavalry were demoralised, but their artillery and infantry remained no less a threat than they had ever been. Lucan’s cavalry, whether they approached the redoubts via the north valley, the south valley, or the Woronzov road, would be riding into fierce resistance.

However construed, Raglan’s fourth order was a recipe for disaster, not so much misconceived as misbegotten. Lucan’s only safe response would have been to ignore it, risking a charge of disobedience. To have done so with ‘the concurrence of his major-general,’ as suggested by Hardinge, would have added the offence of mutiny. As Lord Elcho was to remark, 37 citing the case of an officer who was dismissed the service for questioning an order, ‘the position of an English general was somewhat unfortunate, for . . . a court-martial . . . condemned Lord George Sackville for not doing that which Lord Lucan was condemned for doing.’


* By ‘first’ and ‘second’ orders, Raglan meant orders nos. 3 and 4. He did not acknowledge the existence of orders nos. 1 and 2.

1. W Baring Pemberton, Battles of the Crimean War, B T Batsford Ltd, 1962.

2. Phillips (International Auctioneers and Valuers), Books Catalogue, sale of 13 November 1997.

3. J Harris, The Gallant Six Hundred, Hutchinson & Co Ltd, 1973.

4. W H Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea (3rd edn.), IV.Appendices II and III.

5. Evening Standard, 28 October 1997.

6. Kinglake, op. cit. 15.

7. As to Lucan, Kinglake, op. cit. 361. As to Cardigan, proceedings of the House of Lords, 19 March 1855, reported in The Times, 20 March 1855

8. Proceedings of the House of Lords, 19 March 1855, reported in The Times, 20 March 1855.

9. The Times, 7 April 1855.

10. Tony Lucking, ‘Cardigan v Calthorpe’, The War Correspondent, XIV.iii.24, XIV.iv.22

11. Kinglake, op. cit. Appendix II.

12. Kinglake, op. cit. Appendix III.

13. Mark Adkin, The Charge, Leo Cooper, 1996, p.130.

14. Adkin, op. cit. pp.136,137.

15. Adkin, op. cit. p.125.

16. Quoted in Cardigan’s letter to The Times.

17. Kinglake, op. cit. IV.165, footnote.

18. Adkin, op. cit. pp.258-259.

19. The Times, 29 October 1997.

20. Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why, Penguin Books, 1958.

21. Letter to The Times, 28 July 1868.

22. W H Kinglake, op. cit. IV.192.

23. Lord Raglan’s despatch No. 85 to the Duke of Newcastle, dated 28 October 1854.

24. Lord Raglan’s official letter to the Duke of Newcastle, dated 16 December 1854.

25. Lt-Gen K de Todleben, The Defence of Sebastopol, St. Petersburg, 1863, translated in The Times, 10 September 1864.

26. ibid.

27. Kinglake, op. cit. IV.182.

28. Lt-Col S J G Calthorpe, Letters from Headquarters.

29. Todleben, op. cit.

30. Kinglake, op. cit. IV.176.

31. Kinglake, op. cit. IV.178

32. Kinglake, op. cit. IV.181.

33. Mark Adkin, op. cit. 144

34. Letter to The Times, 3 April 1855

35. Kinglake, op. cit. IV.219, footnote.

36. For a detailed analysis leading to this conclusion, see “Lucan, Cardigan and Raglan's Order” by Major Colin Robins, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 75 (1997), 86-92

37. Proceedings of the House of Commons, Hansard, 29 March 1855.


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